A
federal court in Nevada recently issued
findings of fact and conclusions of law
denying a motion for a new trial in
Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins.Co., No.
CV-S-00-0731-JCM-RJJ (D.Nev. Nov. 17), where
a jury returned a bad faith verdict against
Paul Revere Life and its parent corporation,
UnumProvident, in the sum of $36,000,000.
The court's findings are a thorough
indictment of Unum's business operations
which the court found to have exemplified
systemic bad faith.
The court found more than
ample evidence showing that defendants were
engaged in a scheme to deny their disabled
policyholders' claims dating back to the
early 1990s when the component companies
that ultimately became UnumProvident
Corporation changed from a claims paying
attitude to a ''claim management''
philosophy. In particular, the insurer
targeted so-called ''subjective'' claims
such as those involving chronic fatigue
syndrome and fibromyalgia, and denied claims
lacking ''objective'' evidentiary support,
despite the absence of policy provisions
requiring objective proof, and even though
UnumProvident's internal studies
acknowledged that medical science had yet to
develop objective laboratory tests for such
conditions. Part of the scheme was to make
it more difficult for claimants to prove
their claims by limiting independent medical
examinations and by placing greater reliance
on in-house doctors who were instructed to
''cherry pick records to find grounds for
denying claims regardless of actual merit.''
In addition, the UnumProvident doctors would
''piecemeal'' the claimants' medical
conditions and not consider co-morbidity of
multiple conditions.
UnumProvident also set
targets and goals for increased claim
terminations. When goals were not being met,
pressure would be exerted on claims
personnel to increase terminations. Among
the techniques used was to post Unum's daily
stock trading on a regular basis to show
claims personnel how their actions were
contributing to the overall profitability of
the company.
Despite a multistate
market conduct investigation of the
UnumProvident Corporation and its component
insurance companies, which resulted in an
agreement to reevaluate more than 200,000
previously denied claims, the court found
the numbers of individuals who actually
participated were substantially suppressed
by processes intended to impede
participation. However, of those who did
participate, approximately 42 percent of the
earlier claim denials were overturned.
Nonetheless, Unum's tactics generated huge
savings. Termination of benefit payments
resulted in savings of over $130 million per
quarter in 1996, and testimony credited by
the court revealed that the savings from
unjustified terminations exceeded one
billion dollars.
The court was also able
to relate its findings to the way in which
Merrick's claim was handled and found the
mishandling of his claim was consistent with
the overall scheme. Merrick was a very
successful businessman who worked in the
field of venture capital. He had purchased a
disability policy that would pay $12,000 per
month if he became disabled; and in 1994, he
began experiencing symptoms that were
ultimately diagnosed at the Mayo Clinic as
chronic fatigue syndrome. Although Paul
Revere acknowledged Merrick's disability and
put him on claim, shortly after benefits
commenced, a field investigator visited
Merrick and offered him four months of
benefits if he would give up his claim,
which was worth $1.5 million. At the
conclusion of the visit, the field
investigator tendered a check for one month
of benefits, but language on the back of the
check preceding the space for an endorsement
indicated that acceptance of the payment
would have released the claim in its
entirety. Although Unum tried to justify the
payment as a ''return to work'' benefit, the
court found that explanation incredible
since Merrick was clearly incapable of
returning to work as a venture capitalist at
that time. Merrick was also presented with a
veiled threat that if he did not accept the
payment offered by the field investigator he
might be sued for repayment of the benefits
that had previously been issued.
When Merrick turned down
the ''low ball'' offer, Unum demanded that
he attend an independent medical examination
performed by a neurologist. Although the
examiner disagreed with the chronic fatigue
syndrome diagnosis, he concurred that
Merrick was substantially impaired. After
the examination, though, Merrick was
notified that he was being paid under a
reservation of rights based on the
examiner's conclusion that there was no
objective evidence of disability due to
chronic fatigue syndrome or an alternate
posited diagnosis, Lyme disease.
Unum's tactics impacted
Merrick financially, and also affected him
at a time while he was undergoing a divorce
and his adult daughter was suffering from a
terminal illness. Merrick's teenage son also
died during this period, and shortly after
the son's death, the field investigator
visited him again and told him that all of
the doctors had concurred that he was not
disabled and that if he did not accept three
months of benefit payments, his claim would
be terminated and Unum would sue to recoup
benefits it had paid.
When Merrick refused, his
claim was terminated. Despite there being no
basis for closing the claim, it appeared to
the court the claim was closed in order to
help meet year-end claim closure targets.
After the claim
termination, Merrick submitted additional
documentation which was rejected. For nearly
four years, Merrick tried to get his claim
reinstated; and when his efforts were
unsuccessful, he finally resorted to
litigation. Even though Unum knew Merrick's
illness could not be supported with
objective evidence, it never told Merrick
that fact and kept insisting that he produce
objective evidence.
At trial, Unum's
witnesses proffered false testimony. As one
example, the court pointed out that Unum's
witnesses testified that the insurance
regulators found no wrongdoing.
The court stated, ''This
position was demonstrably wrong and
Defendants knew it. The evidence established
that investigators found widespread
misconduct in Defendants' claims handling
and that Defendants chose to enter into
settlement agreements with regulators in
order to avoid the formal findings of the
very misconduct that they denied.''
The court also referenced
a witness proffered by Unum who denied
knowledge of the ''Columbo award,'' which
was an award given to Unum employees whose
investigations led to the termination of
claims. In addition, the court found notable
that Unum failed to call a single witness to
testify that the bad faith conduct has
changed since the market conduct
investigation. The court went even further,
though, remarking that ''high level
management of Defendants, who knew and
participated in the institutional bad faith
practices, remain in place.'' The court also
determined that Unum remained unrepentant
and was hiding ongoing misconduct.
From the evidence, the
court concluded that Unum engaged in highly
reprehensible misconduct sufficient to
justify a punitive damage award under the
standards set by the Supreme Court. The
court specifically cited Unum's generation
of improper profits ''obtained at the
expense of physically, mentally,
emotionally, and economically vulnerable
individuals, through repeated actions
systematically applied to deprive them of
disability insurance benefits in their time
of need.''
In its third conclusion,
the court explained: ''At the time of
Defendants' second visit to Merrick, his
teenage son had recently died. Merrick's
adult daughter had terminal cancer and he
was supporting her economically. He was
supporting his father. At a time of high
emotional vulnerability Defendants attempted
to settle Merrick's claim for two months of
payments and a threat of litigation. When he
refused their low-ball settlement offer,
Defendants terminated benefits adding to his
emotional stress.''
The court's fifth
conclusion was the most devastating, though.
The court found defendants' actions were
''not the result of accident or
inadvertence, but was part of a widespread
corporate plan or scheme designed to augment
corporate profits through wrongful conduct
targeted at disabled policyholders.'' The
court found a deliberate and conscious
course of conduct intended to disregard
Merrick's rights as well as the rights of
hundreds if not thousands of policyholders.
Finally, the court
determined that none of the payments under
the reassessment or even Unum's agreement
prior to trial to pay Merrick ameliorated
the misconduct. Because of the nature of
Defendants' misconduct, the court found the
jury's award of punitive damages
appropriate, but the verdict was reduced to
a ratio of 9:1, thereby remitting that
portion of the verdict to $26,394,765.39.
This case was the second
trial in this matter. At the initial trial,
the jury had returned a bad faith verdict,
although in a smaller amount. However, the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the verdict due to a defect in the jury
instructions. Merrick v. Paul Revere Life
Ins.Co., 500 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007).
This decision is shocking
and exemplifies what the Supreme Court was
pointing to in Metro.Life Ins. Co. v.
Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008), in
its discussion of insurer conflicts of
interest:
''The conflict of
interest at issue here, for example, should
prove more important (perhaps of great
importance) where circumstances suggest a
higher likelihood that it affected the
benefits decision, including, but not
limited to, cases where an insurance company
administrator has a history of biased claims
administration. See Langbein, supra,
at 1317-1321 (detailing such a history for
one large insurer). It should prove less
important (perhaps to the vanishing point)
where the administrator has taken active
steps to reduce potential bias and to
promote accuracy, for example, by walling
off claims administrators from those
interested in firm finances, or by imposing
management checks that penalize inaccurate
decisionmaking irrespective of whom the
inaccuracy benefits.''
It is evident from this
ruling that instead of best practices to
promote accuracy, what the ruling describes
as ''best practices'' at Unum were directed
toward claim terminations. Moreover, the
court is plainly of the belief that neither
Unum nor its competitors learned a lesson
from the multi-state market conduct
investigation. The court repeatedly cited to
Unum's claimed defense that it had no reason
to be punished since it was acting in the
same manner as its competitors. If that is
true, the disability insurance industry
needs far more stringent regulation and
oversight to prevent another Merrick
case from ever occurring again.
Note: Copies of this
ruling can be obtained by e-mailing me at
mdebofsky@ddbchicago.com.