Articles
The casenote of the month is from the Disability E-News Alert! a monthly newsletter describing new disability insurance developments. For subscription information, e-mail Mark DeBofsky or visit www.disabilityenewsalert.com .
Welch v. Unum Life
Insur.Co. of America, 2004 U.S.App.LEXIS 18507 (10th Cir.
9/1/2004)(Issue: Effect of Post-Disability Modifications) In this matter, the plaintiff became disabled due to
fibromyalgia in 1998 and was approved to receive benefits. However, after the
claimant became disabled, the policy was modified to reduce the duration of
benefit payments to two years for “self-reported” illnesses defined to include
fibromyalgia, and benefits were terminated based on that modification. Welch
challenged the applicability of the policy amendment after she had already
qualified and begun receiving benefits and she won in the district court. On
appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court found there was no right
to vesting of “welfare” benefits (which include disability insurance) under
ERISA. The court held the plan amendment continued the plan with
modifications. The court also rejected the argument made by the plaintiff that
plan benefits vested once she qualified to begin receiving benefits, finding
that an employer or plan sponsor has the right to unilaterally modify or
terminate welfare benefit payments unless it contractually agrees to vest such
benefits. Here, the policy stated it “may be changed in whole or in part.”
Thus, since the policy allowed for amendment, the change did not deprive her of
vested benefits.
The court then turned to the
question of whether the limitation was properly applied. Although numerous
cases have approved the payment of disability benefits for fibromyalgia and have
recognized that the widely-accepted trigger point test is objective, the court
found that the evidence presented in the claim record before the court was
inconclusive. Further, since the issue had not been ruled on by the lower
court, the case was remanded.
Discussion: This
opinion was even criticized by the Employee Benefits Institute of America in its
weekly electronic newsletter which stated:
Courts generally
agree that welfare benefits do not vest absent plan language to that effect. But
the Tenth Circuit's decision in this case is inconsistent with other decisions
that generally hold that welfare benefits cannot be changed after a participant
has qualified for and begun receiving benefits. (See, for example, our article
at
http://www.ebia.com/static/weekly/articles/2002/ERISA021017Feifer.html
(Premium Access subscription required).) For more information, see EBIA's ERISA
Compliance manual at Section XII.E ("Certain Benefits May Be Vested and Thus
Protected From Amendment").
Although as a general
proposition there is little dispute that welfare benefits are not vested absent
a contractual agreement to do so, several courts have ruled that while welfare
benefits may be modified, such changes will not affect a beneficiary whose right
to receive benefits has accrued prior to the modification. Filipowicz v.
American Stores Benefit Plans Committee, 56 F.3d 807, 815 (7th
Cir. 1995); Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991);
and Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
Thus, the amendment should have applied only prospectively to individuals not
yet disabled at the time the amendment went into effect.
However, other cases have held
that post-disability modifications to insert a deferential standard of review
are applicable: Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere, 237 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2001); Hackett v. Xerox, 315 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2003)(January
2003); Sapovits v. Fortis Benefits Ins.Co., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24987 (E.D.Pa. 12/30/02)(January 2003); and
Mizzell v. Paul Revere Insur.Co., 2003 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 14839 (C.D.Cal.
8/25/03)(September 2003).
It will also be interesting to
see how the “self-reported” illness limitation will be ruled upon on remand
since there still is little caselaw on that issue. Morgan v. Unum Life
Insur.Co. of America, 2002 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 17663 (D.Minn. 9/16/02)(October
2002), aff’d Morgan v. Unum Life Insur.Co. of America, 346 F.3d
1173 (8th Cir. 10/22/03)(November 2003) rejected
Unum’s efforts to apply the “self-reported illness” limitation in the policy
(the issue was only discussed in the district court opinion); and, as this
opinion pointed out, Russell v. Unum, 40 F.Supp.2d 747 (D.S.C. 1999),
held that the treating doctor’s detection on examination of trigger points
constituted objective evidence. Also see, McArdle v. Unum, 2001
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20541 (D.Minn. 2001); Robinson v. Unum Life Insur.Co. of
America, 2003 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 4023 (D.N.H. 3/12/03)(April 2003)
held to the contrary, though.
This note appeared in the Disability E-News Alert! For subscription information, please go to www.disabilityenewsalert.com .
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